Lebanese citizens returning to southern Lebanon have devised methods to cross the Litani River, despite Israeli attacks on bridges spanning it. The river’s modest size has allowed people to create temporary crossings.
Online videos show numerous instances where individuals have managed to drive across the river, which often resembles a stream, using makeshift solutions like placing rocks, mud, and other materials over the water.
These improvised crossings have garnered significant attention in regional media. Arab News reported that “Lebanon’s military stated Sunday it had reopened a road and bridge damaged by Israeli strikes in the country’s south as a 10-day truce holds between Hezbollah and Israel.” The return of hundreds of thousands to southern Lebanon potentially highlights the limitations of Israel’s military might.
In both Gaza and Lebanon, Israel has targeted and destroyed civilian infrastructure. This includes the demolition of numerous areas in Gaza that fell under IDF control, referred to as the Yellow Line. Additionally, attacks during the Israel-Hamas War extended to other targets, such as high-rise buildings in Gaza City.
For much of the conflict, these tall buildings remained largely intact until mid-September 2025, when Israeli officials opted for the IDF to retake Gaza City in northern Gaza. This decision came despite prior claims by officials and the IDF that Hamas had been defeated in northern Gaza in late 2023 and early 2024, following numerous IDF operations in Gaza City neighborhoods.
Nevertheless, the decision to reclaim these areas was made in September 2025, leading to evacuation orders for approximately one million Gazans. Many of these individuals had already experienced displacement once or twice during the war, initially between October and January following the October 7 Hamas attack, and then again in the fall of 2024.
A million people, alongside many Hamas members, departed northern Gaza. The targeting of high-rise buildings appeared to be more symbolic than a military imperative. Had these tall structures truly represented a military necessity, they would have been targeted earlier in the conflict. Instead, they stood for nearly two years, from October 2023 to September 2025.
The demolition of Gaza’s high-rises was reportedly celebrated in Jerusalem as “changing the skyline” of Gaza.
If the objective was merely to alter the skyline, it suggests a lack of military necessity. The destruction of high-rises has occurred previously in Gaza, such as during the 2021 conflict. This pattern suggests a symbolic demonstration of Israel’s destructive capability to Hamas, a fact Hamas is likely well aware of after decades of conflict with Israel.
Similarly, in Lebanon, Hezbollah is fully cognizant of the IDF’s capacity to destroy targets at will using air power and munitions, harboring no illusions about Israel’s strength. The decision to target bridges over the Litani River followed the IDF’s call for hundreds of thousands in southern Lebanon to evacuate northward.
Attacks on the bridges commenced in mid-March and persisted into early April. On March 18, for example, the BBC reported bridge destruction, with further reports confirming more demolitions in early April. The IDF stated on March 13 that “a short while ago, the IDF struck the Zrarieh Bridge over the Litani River in Lebanon, which served as a key crossing for terrorists from the Hezbollah terrorist organization.”
Why Target Bridges in Lebanon?
The IDF’s stated justification was that these bridges were utilized by Hezbollah. However, if their destruction was a military necessity to impede Hezbollah, questions arise as to why they were not targeted in October 2023, when the group initiated its attacks on Israel.
Furthermore, why were they not struck in September 2024 during Israel’s escalated strikes against Hezbollah? And why not immediately on March 2, 2026, following a Hezbollah attack on Israel that led to the recent escalation?
Instead, the bridges were targeted gradually over time, after hundreds of thousands of Lebanese civilians had already fled northward. This timing raises questions: was the objective to halt Hezbollah, or to complicate the return of civilians? If the aim was to counter Hezbollah, the ease with which civilians can cross the Litani in cars and vans suggests Hezbollah could likely do the same.
Hezbollah, a group that has operated in southern Lebanon for over 40 years, consistently faces superior Israeli airpower capable of monitoring its movements. It is plausible that such a group, operating under constant surveillance, would have developed methods for transporting weapons that do not rely on well-known bridges.
Modern air power makes it feasible to destroy numerous bridges simultaneously. Historically, in 1946, the pre-state Jewish underground successfully destroyed 10 out of 11 bridges connecting British Mandate Palestine to neighboring countries in a single night (June 16-17). If the Palmach could achieve this in one night, why does the IDF not destroy all Litani bridges simultaneously? Such an action would presumably disrupt Hezbollah, if that were the primary objective.
During the war with Iran, the IDF reported in April that it “struck eight bridge segments that were utilized by the Iranian terror regime’s armed forces for transporting weapons and military equipment in several areas across Iran, including Tehran, Karaj, Tabriz, Kashan, and Qom.” A similar rapid campaign against bridges could have been executed in Lebanon if that had been the strategic goal.
Examples from the Vietnam War
During the Vietnam War, Communist forces effectively transported vast numbers of personnel and supplies through dense jungles, often by creating small roads like the renowned Ho Chi Minh Trail. Vietnamese insurgents not only overcame the French at Dien Bien Phu by moving artillery and troops through challenging terrain but also successfully applied similar tactics against the US and its South Vietnamese allies.
Despite the overwhelming air power deployed by the US, the Vietnamese ultimately succeeded. If such feats were possible in the 1950s and 1960s, it suggests that Hezbollah could similarly traverse the relatively small Litani River.
Undoubtedly, Israel’s monitoring technology for Hezbollah far surpasses US capabilities during the Vietnam War. If bombing bridges were a genuine military necessity, it would logically have been executed much earlier. This observation appears to connect the strategy concerning bridges with that of high-rises in Gaza.
Israel has engaged in a protracted, gradual conflict on both fronts. In both scenarios, the IDF has called for millions to evacuate, yet its ground forces have advanced slowly, typically covering only a few kilometers. The objective does not appear to be rapid conquest. For example, in 1978, the IDF captured the area south of the Litani in a matter of days. In 2026, the same operation took a month and a half, and the IDF did not secure the entire area.
This analysis highlights the contemporary limitations of Israel’s military force. Hamas retains control over half of Gaza, and Hezbollah continues to control parts of Lebanon. Despite assertions that these groups would be disarmed “the easy way or the hard way,” military force has not achieved this objective. Instead, symbolic targets like bridges appear to have served as a substitute for actual disarmament.
Throughout history, military force has been employed to achieve diverse objectives. However, strategists like Carl von Clausewitz and Colin Powell have emphasized the necessity of aligning military tactics with clear political goals and achievable military objectives.
The destruction of bridges in southern Lebanon appears more punitive than a strategic action contributing to a military or political objective. The rapid repair of some crossings within days further illustrates the diminishing returns of this symbolic campaign against the bridges.
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