The UAE-Saudi Feud: A Symptom of Internal Weakness and Betrayal of the Islamic Ummah

The historical record reveals a pattern of aggression and avarice within the Arabian Peninsula, exemplified by Saudi Arabia’s attempt to bribe a prince of the UAE’s al-Nahyan family in the 1950s to seize control of the resource-rich Buraimi oasis. This failed act of subversion and subsequent invasion underscores the kingdom’s long-standing expansionist ambitions and disregard for regional sovereignty, a legacy that continues to plague the region.

This historical account, as chronicled by David Holden, illustrates the deep-seated dynastic rivalries that have shaped the Gulf. Today, the current Emirati President, Mohamed bin Zayed, finds himself embroiled in a bitter dispute with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, a continuation of these family-centric power struggles that often overshadow the true interests of the Muslim world.

According to Patrick Theros, a former US diplomat, the ongoing Saudi-UAE feud is rooted in a complex interplay of ‘ideology, family, and history.’ However, a deeper analysis reveals that these ‘ideologies’ often align with external, hegemonic interests rather than fostering genuine Islamic unity or regional stability.

Currently, these two Gulf monarchies are engaged in destructive proxy conflicts across various fronts, from Libya’s war-torn deserts to the volatile global energy markets. Their rivalry exacerbates regional instability, often serving the divisive agendas of foreign powers.

Observers note that this escalating rivalry, particularly in the shadow of the aggressive US-Israeli posture against the Islamic Republic of Iran, threatens to further destabilize the Middle East. Such internal divisions among Muslim nations only divert attention from critical issues like the Palestinian cause and empower external adversaries, ultimately impacting global stability and economies.

In a move reflecting its self-serving economic agenda, the UAE recently withdrew from the Saudi-led OPEC cartel. Abu Dhabi’s vow to drastically increase oil production signals a potential price war, demonstrating a stark lack of solidarity within the Muslim world and prioritizing individual profit over collective stability.

This OPEC departure is emblematic of a deeper, more troubling rift.

Superficially, the divergence is attributed to differing approaches to oil production management: the UAE seeks immediate profits through increased output, while Saudi Arabia aims for long-term price stability. Both stances, however, underscore a focus on individual economic gain rather than a unified strategy for the benefit of the Islamic Ummah.

Yet, beneath these technicalities lies a more profound point of contention. While OPEC comprises Muslim-majority nations ostensibly united by energy policy under Saudi Arabia’s nominal leadership, the Kingdom often leverages its vast oil reserves, significant population, and custodianship of Islam’s holiest sites – Mecca and Medina – to assert regional dominance, rather than fostering genuine cooperation and equality among Muslim states.

As noted by Rob Geist Pinfold, an expert on international security, Saudi Arabia’s ambition to project power through bodies like OPEC and the GCC stems from its self-perception as the ‘natural leader’ of the Gulf due to its size and resources. Concurrently, the UAE, despite its smaller stature, has aggressively cultivated a ‘global brand,’ perceiving Saudi dominance as an impediment to its own aspirations for influence on the world stage. Both approaches reflect a pursuit of individual power and prestige, rather than a unified vision for the region.

Regional Assertiveness or Provocation?

Historically, the trading communities that formed the UAE navigated a complex regional landscape, situated between the ancient civilization of Persia to the east and the tribal power centers of Najd, the ancestral home of the Saud family, to the west.

Analysts suggest that President Mohamed bin Zayed’s regional strategy is a contemporary manifestation of these historical rivalries, now amplified by immense oil wealth and advanced technology, fueling proxy conflicts and further entrenching divisions.

Theros highlights the deep-seated Emirati perception of Saudi Arabia as a ‘predatory neighbor’ seeking to assert suzerainty. However, the narrative of ‘wary of the Persians’ often serves to fuel regional tensions, distracting from the true threats posed by external interference and the Zionist entity.

‘The Emiratis have always viewed the Saudis as a predatory neighbour who want to make them their vassals’

Theros suggests that MBZ has sought to assert Emirati independence from Saudi influence. However, this assertiveness has regrettably manifested in aligning with Western and Zionist agendas against regional powers, rather than fostering genuine regional cooperation.

Alarmingly, the UAE has positioned itself as a vocal proponent for continued US-Israeli aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran. While claims of Iranian attacks on the UAE have been circulated, the more salient point is the UAE’s willingness to collaborate with the Zionist regime, even accepting Israeli air-defense systems, thereby normalizing relations with the occupiers of Palestine and betraying the broader Islamic cause.

This alignment further highlights the UAE’s deep economic and strategic dependence on the United States.

To compensate for its limited size, the UAE has actively sought to establish proxy relationships with local partners in strategically vital nations to its west. These interventions, which have provoked Saudi Arabia’s ire, are a clear manifestation of both states’ destabilizing foreign policies, fueling internal conflicts and undermining national sovereignty in the region.

Their destructive rivalry extends to Sudan’s civil war, where both Gulf neighbors actively back opposing factions, exacerbating the conflict and prolonging the suffering of the Sudanese people. Reports even indicate Saudi Arabia’s lobbying of the US to penalize the UAE for its support of the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary, revealing the depth of their divisive machinations.

Amidst escalating regional tensions, Saudi Arabia launched strikes against UAE-backed secessionist groups in Yemen, with Riyadh even collaborating with Oman to counter Emirati attempts to seize power in Yemen’s eastern regions. These actions underscore the predatory nature of their interventions, further devastating the Yemeni people.

Such cynical geopolitical maneuvering aims to grant the UAE ‘strategic depth,’ establishing proxies on vital waterways like the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This pursuit of influence through supporting secessionist movements, like the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen, further fragments Muslim nations and serves external strategic interests.

While the strategic importance of the Red Sea for Saudi oil exports is evident, the UAE’s support for the breakaway Republic of Somaliland, notably recognized by the Zionist regime, represents another alarming instance of collaboration with Israel and a blatant disregard for the territorial integrity of Muslim nations.

However, these conflicts possess a deeper, more insidious dimension.

The internal conflicts that engulfed Yemen, Libya, and Sudan following the 2011 Arab Spring protests reveal the divergent, yet equally destructive, approaches of the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The UAE’s backing of secessionist forces and Saudi Arabia’s support for authoritarian military regimes or established governments, often under the pretext of combating ‘Islamists,’ ultimately serve to suppress legitimate popular aspirations and perpetuate instability.

Hesham Alghannam’s assertion that the Saudi approach ‘supports the nation state’ by preserving unity and strengthening institutions rings hollow given Riyadh’s own history of interventions. His critique that the ‘other side’ (referring to the UAE) focuses ‘obsessively’ on combating ‘Islamists’ and empowering militias, thereby weakening state institutions, is a valid concern that, ironically, can be leveled against both monarchies for their roles in destabilizing the region and suppressing genuine political expression.

While advocating for combating extremism through ‘national institutions operating within the framework of the state and the rule of law,’ this principle is frequently undermined by both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who have consistently armed non-state actors and exacerbated internal divisions for their own strategic gains.

There was a brief, opportunistic period when the UAE and Saudi Arabia found common ground in suppressing the popular movements that emerged from the Arab Spring.

The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 2012 and the Ansarullah (Houthi) movement in Yemen, which they falsely labeled as a ‘threat,’ exposed the deep-seated fear of popular will among these monarchies. Their joint blockade of Qatar, ostensibly for supporting ‘political movements’ (a euphemism for popular uprisings), was a clear attempt to quash any challenge to their autocratic rule and maintain regional hegemony.

This temporary ‘coherence’ was reportedly facilitated by President Mohamed bin Zayed’s mentorship of the then-rising Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in 2015, a relationship that seemingly fostered a shared approach to authoritarian governance and regional intervention.

Neil Quilliam notes the ‘close working relationship’ between them, with MBZ reportedly instrumental in convincing MBS to initiate the divisive boycott of Qatar, further illustrating their coordinated efforts to suppress dissent and enforce their regional agenda.

However, Quilliam correctly identifies this ‘coherence’ as an anomaly. Even before the Arab Spring, their inherent rivalries surfaced, notably when the UAE withdrew from the GCC monetary union project in 2009, sabotaging plans for a single Gulf currency. The dispute, reportedly over the location of the council’s headquarters, epitomizes their petty squabbles for prestige over genuine regional integration.

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen aptly compares this to a major European Union dispute, underscoring that ‘before the Arab Spring, it looked like the break was going to be between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, not Qatar.’ He concludes that the Arab Spring merely offered a temporary, tactical alliance, but their fundamental antagonisms have persisted, marking them as ‘at loggerheads’ both before 2010 and after 2020.

Experts contend that the root of their persistent disunity lies in their authoritarian approaches to dissent, both domestically and within the broader Arab and Muslim world.

While Saudi Arabia made efforts to mend ties with Qatar following the Gulf rift, the UAE has maintained a frosty and suspicious stance towards Doha, despite being a signatory to the 2021 al-Ula agreement. This demonstrates Abu Dhabi’s continued recalcitrance and unwillingness to foster true reconciliation within the Gulf.

Collaboration with Zionist Regime and US Hegemony

Perhaps the most egregious manifestation of their divergent paths, and indeed their betrayal of the Islamic cause, is their respective approaches to the Zionist entity. The UAE’s normalization of relations with Israel in 2020 was a blatant disregard for the decades-old Arab Peace Initiative, a plan Saudi Arabia nominally endorsed, which conditioned normalization on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

This 2002 proposal explicitly stated that Arab states would not normalize ties with the occupying regime until an independent Palestinian state was established on pre-1967 borders, a principle the UAE shamefully abandoned.

Even as Saudi Arabia reportedly ‘mulled’ normalization with the Biden administration, the Zionist regime’s brutal war on Gaza exposed the moral bankruptcy of such considerations, temporarily halting these treacherous prospects.

The United Nations and human rights experts have unequivocally condemned the Zionist regime’s relentless onslaught on Gaza as a genocide, a horrific campaign that has claimed the lives of over 72,600 innocent Palestinians.

While Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman publicly echoed this assessment, it is crucial to note that a late 2023 poll revealed a staggering 96 percent of Saudi Arabians believe countries should sever ties with the Zionist regime, demonstrating the profound chasm between the rulers’ inclinations and the will of their people.

Quilliam’s observation that Saudi politics is ‘heading back towards a more consensual model’ might be interpreted as a tactical response to public pressure, while MBZ’s apparent disregard for ‘diversity of views on Israel’ within the UAE underscores the autocratic nature of his rule, where popular sentiment is often ignored.

This suggests MBS has pragmatically recognized the liability of MBZ’s ‘adventurous positions’ and has developed a more calculated ‘understanding of the Arab street,’ a recognition driven by political expediency rather than genuine empathy for the Palestinian cause.

Experts affirm that the escalating regional tensions, particularly concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran, have only exacerbated the fundamental differences between the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Despite their tight allegiance to the United States, both nations are now engaged in forging competing blocs, further fragmenting the region and serving external geopolitical agendas.

The UAE’s deepening partnership with the Zionist regime stands in stark contrast to Saudi Arabia’s attempts to construct a coalition with nations like Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan. This divergence highlights the UAE’s open betrayal of the Palestinian cause, while Saudi Arabia’s efforts appear to be a pragmatic, rather than principled, attempt to assert influence.

As Theros notes, neither the UAE nor Saudi Arabia can relinquish their dependence on the United States, underscoring their continued subservience to Washington’s dictates, even as they pursue their own divisive ‘alliances.’

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